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Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created toward the end of World War II. One of its main objectives is to help governments resolve temporary balance of payments problems.
At present 184 countries are members of the IMF and eligible to take out loans from the Fund.
However, not all borrowing is automatic. At a certain level of borrowing, a government must commit to adjustment programs in exchange for access to IMF funds (Mussa and Savastano, 2000) .
How does the IMF decide on its lending? Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF states that the activities of the Fund should, among other things, "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade" and "promote exchange stability". In other words, one should expect IMF lending to be based on mainly economic considerations. Indeed, various studies, many of which will be reviewed in the present paper, find that the chance that a country receives IMF support depends on the economic situation in the country concerned.
Notably variables like a country's reserve position, its debt service, and its real growth rate are often found to be important determinants of the likelihood that a country receives IMF credit.
However, it would be hard to deny that-at least to some extent-political-economic factors may also play a role in the Fund's lending decisions. As the Financial Times reports, this view is shared by the new managing director of the IMF, who regards the IMF "primarily as a political institution", in which "technical analysis must play a secondary role to politics". 1 In his recent discussion of the debate on the IMF, Willett (2001, p. 595) even argues that "in a number of instances the IMF has been forced to abandon its economic principles in order to do the political bidding of its major shareholders, the governments of the United States and the other industrial countries." Indeed, Thacker (1999) and Barro and Lee (2002) report evidence suggesting that access to IMF funds is skewed towards countries that are aligned with the US. The alleged political manipulation of the IMF has led some scholars to recommend that it be given greater formal independence, similar to the independence nowadays granted to central banks (see, for instance, De Gregorio et al., 1999) . 2 In addition, political factors are likely to come into play from the demand side. To ensure that adjustment programs be implemented in countries receiving funds, the IMF must take factors that drive domestic political processes into account. For instance, reaching an agreement with the authorities that stands little chance of being approved by the legislature of the country concerned seems futile (Willett, 2001) . 3 Furthermore, ethnic, political, and other divisions may weaken government's resolve to undertake reforms. Special interest groups that benefit from the continuation of distortionary policies that emerge during any process of economic reform may put pressure on the government (Mayer and Mourmouras, 2002) .
The empirical literature on the determinants of IMF credit suffers from some drawbacks. First, a wide variety of variables has been suggested as determinants of IMF involvement and there is little consensus in the literature which variables really matter.
Second, most authors do not carefully examine the sensitivity of their findings. Thus it is hard to tell whether the variables reported to be significant in a particular regression are really robustly related to the likelihood that a country has an agreement with the Fund. Third, although some papers include political variables, most studies do not offer a systematic analysis of the role that political factors may play. 4 Authors, who take political factors into account, generally focus on a limited number of political variables only. Our results suggest that most of the political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement in a member country are non-significant. However, 3 Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) have developed a model in which the Fund's financing and the conditionality attached to it change the incentives of the borrowing government and affect the political economy equilibrium in the recipient country. In this model government is subject to pressure by interest groups. Likewise, in Drazen's (2001) model the government must contend with domestic veto players. The number and power of veto players depends on a country's political and constitutional institutions. 4 An exception is Rowlands (1995).
some political variables affect the likelihood that a member country signs an agreement with the IMF, while decisions on IMF credit disbursement are primarily based on economic considerations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the variables that we take into account on the basis of previous studies. Section 3 explains the modelling strategy, while Section 4 contains the empirical results. The final section offers some concluding comments.
Economic and political determinants of IMF involvement
Appendix A1 summarizes studies that have been published since the beginning of the 1990s dealing with the determinants of IMF credit (for a review of the older literature, see Bird (1995) and Knight and Santaella (1997) ). 5 These studies generally use a binary choice model (logit, probit) to distinguish between countries and time periods where an IMF program was in place and those where it was not, in order to determine which economic and political factors influenced IMF involvement. 6 As Knight and Santaella (1997) point out, the regressions can be interpreted as the reduced form derived from the "demand" for an IMF
program by a recipient country and the IMF's "supply". 7 As we will point out below, previous studies have used a wide array of explanatory variables. Furthermore, the results for particular variables are often mixed.
On the basis of previous studies we have selected a number of economic variables for further empirical analysis. Selecting those variables that have been included in at least two studies gave the following list:
• International reserve holdings scaled to imports (INTRESERV). Countries with relatively low levels of international reserves relative to imports will be less able to meet balance of payments difficulties through reserve use and hence will be more likely to request and receive IMF credit (Knight and Santaella, 1997) . This variable has been included in almost all studies summarized in Table A1 and is generally reported to have a significant coefficient.
5 There is another line of literature that examines the impact of IMF adjustment programs; see Bird (2001) for a survey. 6 Bird and Rowlands (2003b) have used non-parametric tests for 161 countries for the years 1965 to 2000. They find that countries that sign an IMF agreement have a significantly worse current account balance than other countries, although this pattern is time variant. Signing countries also had more problems with their reserves, especially if they had a more fixed exchange rate regime. High government budget deficits were also associated with an increasing likelihood of signing an agreement with the IMF. 7 As far as we know, only four studies (Knight and Santaella, 1997 , Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000 and Vreeland, 1999 ) have tried to disentangle both factors, but the separation of demand and supply factors in these studies remains a rather difficult task that has drawn severe criticism (see Dreher and Vaubel, 2000) .
• Real GDP growth (GGDP). Countries experiencing relatively weak growth in real GDP probably demand more credit. Various studies (including Barro and Lee, 2002 and Dreher and Vaubel, 2004) find this variable to be significant, but Bird and Rowlands (2001) find that it is not. As there is a possible endogeneity problem with this variable, it enters with a one-period lag in our models (GGDP1).
• Debt service scaled to exports (DEBTSERV). A heavy debt burden relative to exports increases countries' need for external finance to service that debt. Many authors have included this variable in their models. 8 The results for this variable are mixed, however.
While, for instance, Rowlands (1995) finds it to be significant, Joyce (1992) concludes that it does not affect the chance that a country is involved in an IMF program.
• Current account balance/GDP (CURACC). A country that has a balance of payments need for financial resources will be more likely to demand IMF credit. The results for this variable are surprisingly mixed: various authors conclude that the balance of payment did not affect the chances that a country has an IMF program (see, for instance, Knight and Santaella, 1997, and Vreeland, 2001) . Given the possible endogeneity problem with this variable, it enters with a one-period lag in our models (CURACC1).
• External debt/GDP (DEBT). A high debt ratio may not only lead to more demand for IMF credit, but also to more supply as a high debt ratio may give a country bargaining leverage over the IMF because of its importance for global financial stability (Strom, 1999) . On the other hand, a high debt ratio may reduce the creditworthiness of the country concerned.
The results for this variable are, again, rather mixed. Whereas various studies (including Rowlands, 1995 and Thacker, 1999) find no effect of this variable, Bird and Rowlands (2001) find that it has a significant negative impact in their probit model. This variable is included with a one-period lag in our models as well (DEBT1).
• Income per capita (GDPCAP). Low-income countries may be more likely to seek Fund assistance.
9 Interestingly, various authors report a negative impact of income per capita in their probit models, Rowlands (1995) and Barro and Lee (2002) being the exceptions. The first study finds no effect, while the latter reports a positive impact, in combination with the square of GDP per capita, suggesting that the relationship is non-linear. In our model we use the lagged value of income per capita (GDPCAP1).
8 Sometimes GDP is used as scaling factor (see, for instance, Vreeland (1999 Vreeland ( , 2001 ) and Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) . We prefer using exports as a scaling factor as interest in outstanding debt will have to be paid for by the receipts from exports. 9 Knight and Santaella (1997) (Dreher and Vaubel, 2004 ), no effect (e.g. Joyce, 1992) to positive (Bird, 1995) . Also this variable is included with a lag (INFL1).
• Lagged value of the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar (XRATE1). Countries faced with a speculative attack are more likely to turn to the IMF for assistance (Knight and Santaella, 1997) .
• Lagged government budget deficit/GDP (DEFICIT1). Governments with high budget deficits are more likely to turn to the Fund (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000) . 10 However, the Fund is more likely to enter into an arrangement with a country when its budget constraint is less binding. While some studies find no effect (e.g. Vreeland, 2001), others report a negative impact (e.g. Vreeland, 1999) of this variable.
• Lagged growth rate of the terms of trade (GTOT1). A worsening of a country's terms of trade is likely to weaken a country's external position, thereby increasing the likelihood that it will need to seek Fund assistance. Conway (1994) finds a negative impact of this variable, while Knight and Santaella (1997) find no effect.
• Lagged investment/GDP (INV1). A low ratio of investment to GDP may indicate limited access to international capital markets, thereby making it more likely that it requests Fund assistance. Knight and Santaella (1997), Vreeland (1999) , Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2001) find support for this view.
• LIBOR. An increase in the world interest rate may cause countries to turn to the IMF for assistance. Some authors report support for this view (e.g. Dreher and Vaubel, 2004) , while others do not (e.g. Rowlands, 1995).
• Lagged government expenditure/GDP (GOVSPEND1). Some studies have included a variable for government spending sometimes also found to be significant (see e.g. Joyce, 1992 ).
Turning to the IMF for financial assistance is a political decision. However, for an IMF program to be agreed on, not only does a government have to apply for funds, the IMF must also agree to the loan. From the demand as well as the supply side, the literature has suggested institutions. Some critics of the IMF would perhaps interpret a significant effect of an income variable as support for the claim that the IMF has become to much of an aid agency (Rowlands, 1995) . 10 Bird and Rowlands (2003b) conclude that ignoring fiscal imbalances is unacceptable in an analysis of IMF program adoption.
various political factors that may influence the decision-making process on IMF loans. In selecting political variables to be used in our empirical model, we will systematically discuss political factors that have been recently suggested in the literature and identify proxies that can be applied to test the various hypotheses. Many of the variables can be interpreted both as determinants of government's demand for IMF credit and as criteria by which the IMF may judge the creditworthiness of countries demanding credit.
It is well-known from the literature that there is a high degree of persistence in IMF involvement (Hutchison and Noy, 2003) . To capture this, we follow Przeworky and Vreeland (2000) using the lag of a 5-years moving average of a dummy indicating whether or not a country was under an agreement (YRSUNDER51).
Not all countries that would be eligible to draw resources from the IMF would decide to do so to the extent that they perceive some loss of discretion over their choice of adjustment policy. Especially, as argued by Bird and Rowlands (2000) , governments that perceive a large gap between their preferred policies and those expected in the context of IMF conditionality are the least likely to turn to the Fund. However, the more countries turn to the Fund, the less costly the 'sovereignty costs' may be perceived to be. Following Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) we therefore include a variable reflecting the number of other countries in which the Fund is involved (NRUNDER). Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) suggest that governments are more likely to enter an agreement early in the election term, hoping that any perceived stigma of signing an agreement will be forgiven or forgotten before the next elections. In other words, demand for IMF credit might be higher after election years. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) report evidence in support of this view. While various safeguards against the misuse of IMF resources are routinely incorporated into IMF lending programs, Dreher and Vaubel (2004) suggest that the availability of IMF credit might indirectly help to finance electoral campaigns. They find that net credit supplied by the IMF is generally higher around election time.
11 To test for the effect of elections, we include two election dummy variables: one for election years for the executive (ELECEX) and one for election years for the legislative (ELEXLEG). As previous studies argue that there should be an effect before and/or after the election, we take the lag and the lead of the election dummies.
The possibility of blaming the IMF for the necessary adjustment policies may be an incentive to resort to the Fund. By involving the Fund in the decision-making process, national politicians may be able to shield themselves from the political fall-out of unpopular policies (Vaubel, 1986) . Countries with more unstable and polarized political systems will have more difficulties to arrange a credible adjustment program and will, therefore, have a higher incentive to turn to the Fund. In this way, they will obtain a seal of approval for a political program and, thus, gain in credibility. We have applied a number of proxies to capture this argument: the number of political assassinations (ASSAS), and revolutions (REVOL), and guerilla problems (GUERIL), the (lagged) number of government crises (CRISIS) 12 , and instability within the government (GOVCHANGE). On the other hand, the IMF might be less willing to provide its seal of approval when there is less than full political support of such a program. The issue whether international organizations such as the IMF should or should not seek broad local support for the policies they endorse or incorporate in lending conditions is at the heart of the debate on 'country ownership' (see, for instance, Helleiner, 2001 ). In the end, the existence and direction of the relationship between the above listed variables with the disbursement of IMF resources is, therefore, an empirical question.
In general, the decision to involve the IMF crucially depends on government's assessment of the political costs that may result from the adjustment policies. A high level of Another implication of this line of reasoning is that autocratic regimes-proxied by an executive index of competitiveness (EXCOMP)-will have a smaller incentive to request IMF assistance as they can more easily withstand unpopular adjustment programs Rowlands, 2001, Edwards and Santaella, 1993) . On the other hand, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) argue that as dictatorships are less constrained by public opinion and competitive elections, they may make easier negotiation partners for the IMF, and are therefore more likely to get credit. Which, if any, argument prevails is again an empirical question.
Political interests of its principal shareholders may be seen to influence decisions by the IMF. An 85 percent majority is required for the most important Fund decisions. Since voting power is-broadly speaking-allocated on the basis of economic size, the US (which controls 17.83 percent of the voting power in the IMF), as well as small coalitions of industrialized 11 Dreher (2004) reports that governments that conclude an IMF arrangement within 12 months prior to an election generally increase their re-election probability. 12 As government crises may also occur due to an IMF stabilization program, we take the lagged value of crises to circumvent endogeneity.
countries hold veto power in the Fund's decision making (Thacker, 1999) . 14 Another argument as to how the interests of large industrial countries may influence IMF credit supply has been put forward by Oatley and Yackee (2000) and Oatley (2002) . These papers find evidence suggesting that IMF lending decisions are responsive to these interests as larger loans went to countries in which commercial banks from industrial countries were highly exposed. Still, Oatley (2002) concludes that not all commercial banks benefit to the same degree. Commercial banks based in Japan do not seem to benefit at all, while banks based in
France benefit less than banks based in Germany, the UK, the US, and Switzerland. We include in our model the variable USBANKS that shows the exposure of US banks to the various countries under consideration. We also include a variable reflecting the importance of the US as a trading partner: imports and exports from/to US as share of total trade of a particular country (TRADEUS). It may also be true that the main stakeholders in the IMF have stronger preferences for countries in a certain region. For instance, the US may be more concerned with countries in Asia than in Africa, say. We therefore include regional dummy variables in our model. (2000) The size of a country requesting support may also matter: larger countries-proxied by (lagged) relative size (RELSIZE)-may more easily get support to the extent that the 'systemic' or 'contagion' risk of a balance of payments problem in these countries is higher than in smaller countries.
Bird and Rowlands
Of course, the influence of a country in the IMF may also affect the chance that it will receive a loan. For given economic conditions, an IMF loan is more likely the higher the quota of a country. Following Barro and Lee (2002) , we therefore include share of IMF quotas (IMFQUOTA) as explanatory variable.
13 All these variables enter with a one-period lag. This also helps to avoid the possible endogeneity problem. Demonstrations, strikes, and riots may contemporaneously increase if the government has to take unpopular measures as part of an IMF stabilization program. 14 There is evidence suggesting that the degree to which countries vote in line with the US in the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) might affect the chance that a country will receive IMF credit (Thacker, Finally, some other variables reflecting supply considerations may be found in the recent literature on the determinants of success and failure of IMF or World Bank-supported programs. Dollar and Svensson (2000) conclude in their study of Bank-supported adjustment programs that success can be predicted by a small number of domestic political economy variables, including ethnic divisions, government instability, and undemocratic governments.
Likewise, Ivanova et al. (2003) conclude in their study of success and failure of IMFsupported programs that the strength of special interests in parliament, political cohesion and ethnic diversity affect the probability of successful program implementation. Therefore, we have included the following variables:
• Ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC). Ethnic fractionalization leads to conflict in society, which is a threat to reform efforts.
• Special interests (INTERESTS): the maximum share of seats in parliament held by parties representing special interests (religious, nationalistic, regional and rural groups). This variable is also used by Ivanova et al. (2003) .
• Political cohesion (IPCOH). Lower political cohesion introduces more uncertainty regarding the implementation of reforms.
Appendix A2 describes all variables employed in the present paper in more detail and gives the sources, while appendix A3 shows the correlation matrix. As Table A3 shows, the correlation between the variables is generally quite low, except for the inflation rate and the exchange rate.
Modeling approach
We employ (variants) of the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) to examine which explanatory variables are robustly related to our dependent variable. To the best of our knowledge, this has never been done before in the literature on the determinants of IMF credit, although there are some very good reasons to apply this methodology.
The EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature (see Sturm and De Haan, 2004 for a further discussion). The central difficulty in this research-which also applies to the research topic of the present paper-is that several different models may all seem reasonable given the data, but yield different conclusions about the parameters of interest. Indeed, a glance at the studies summarized in Appendix A1 illustrates this point. The 1999 and Barro and Lee, 2002) . Unfortunately, we could not test this hypothesis as we did not have access to the proper data.
results of these studies sometimes differ substantially, while most authors do not offer a careful analysis to examine how sensitive their conclusions are with respect to model specification. As pointed out by Temple (2000) , presenting only the results of the model preferred by the author can be misleading.
The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following general form are estimated:
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of 'standard' explanatory variables; F is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three (here we follow Levine and Renelt, 1992) possible additional explanatory variables, which according to the literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term. The extreme bounds test for variable F states that if the lower extreme bound for β-i.e. the lowest value for β minus two standard deviations-is negative, while the upper extreme bound for β-i.e. the highest value for β plus two standard deviations-is positive, the variable F is not robustly related to Y.
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with certainty that some model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In these circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the findings are to alternative modeling choices. The EBA provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly this. Still, the EBA has been criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) argues that the test applied in the extreme bounds analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases. If the distribution of β has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find at least one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run.
We will therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i- Martin's (1997a,b) suggestion to analyze the entire distribution. Following this suggestion, we not only report the unweighted parameter estimate of β and its standard deviation but also the unweighted cumulative distribution function (CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero.
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We will base our conclusions on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA.
Another objection to EBA is that the initial partition of variables in the M and in the Z vector is likely to be rather arbitrary. Still, as pointed out by Temple (2000) , there is no reason why standard model selection procedures (such as testing down from a general specification) cannot be used in advance to identify variables that seem to be particularly relevant-an approach that we have followed as well. We use the 13 economic variables as discussed in section 2 (see Appendix A2) and a general-to-specific selection procedure to come up with our basic model. We first examine how robust this basic model is. Next, we check whether the other economic and political variables discussed in section 2 are robustly related to the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an IMF agreement.
Results

Explaining the Use of IMF Credit
The first dependent variable considered is based on the "use of IMF credit" as reported in the World Bank Development Indicators 2003. 16 We have created a dummy variable that is one when the use of IMF credit is positive. So, this variable measures whether or not a country receives IMF credit in a specific year.
Our data set includes annual data for 128 IMF member countries over the period 1972 to 1998. We have employed a panel model and estimate binary choice probit models by maximum likelihood. We use White (1980) errors to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.
In line with the view that decision-making within the IMF should be primarily based on economic considerations, we start by identifying a basic model using standard model selection procedures (general to specific) using the 13 economic variables as discussed in section 2. An extensive analysis of the data based on a general to specific approach yielded the two variables that we selected for our M vector: international reserve holdings scaled to imports (INTRESERV) and lagged real GDP growth (GGDP1). These variables (or variables akin to these) are also present in most models of IMF lending behavior in the literature (compare Table A1 in the appendix). A decrease in available international reserves signals pressure on the value of a national currency on the forex markets. Arguably, extending credit to member countries that experience exchange rate problems is part of the traditional IMF mission. A possible explanation of the negative correlation between IMF credit disbursement a problem. Sturm and De Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights constructed in this way are not equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention to the unweighted version.
and real growth is that countries suffering a severe real shock are more likely to turn to the IMF for help. However, real shocks might also lead to financial and exchange rate crises (Allen and Gale, 2000) , triggering IMF support for member countries.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis of the basic model.
The first two columns show the extreme lower and upper bounds, while column (7) shows the specification of the models yielding the upper and lower extreme bounds. Column (3) reports the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable of interest differs significantly from zero. Column (4) shows the CDF(0). Columns (5) and (6) in almost all regressions underlying this CDF(0). However, according to the very stringent EBA the variables do not qualify as being robustly related to our dependent variable, since the upper and lower bound change sign-which illustrates the advantages of applying the Sala-iMartin approach rather than the original EBA approach proposed by Leamer (1983) . Our conclusions are not influenced by the inclusion of either the exchange rate or inflation in the Z-vector. As follows from Panel C of Table 1 , the CDF(0) of inflation and the exchange rate does not exceed 0.95.
Explaining the Signing of IMF Agreements
As pointed out in section 2, a large number of previous studies focuses on the likelihood that a country in a particular year has an adjustment program with the Fund. It should be interesting to see whether the results on IMF credit disbursement extend to an analysis of the determinants of the adoption of IMF agreements. To that end we apply the approach developed above to a new dummy variable indicating whether an IMF agreement was signed in a particular year. 17 While we would expect the determinants of actual credit disbursement and the signing of IMF agreements to be similar, these two variables still describe two fairly distinct decisions: the signing of an agreement between the IMF and a member country and the disbursement of IMF credit to a particular member country. These decisions are likely to be influenced by different considerations. Furthermore, an agreement will often lead to more than one year of credit flows. Credit flows can be changed or interrupted if certain conditions specified in the adjustment program are not fulfilled. Finally, countries can borrow from the IMF up to their quota without an agreement. Table 2 shows the results. We have employed the same basic model as in our previous analysis, i.e. INTRESERV and (lagged) GGDP are the explanatory variables. As shown in panel A of Table 2 , the variables in the basic model have a CDF(0) larger than 0.95. Still, the CDF(0)s and the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficients of INTRESERV and (lagged) GGDP are significant are somewhat lower than in Table 1 .
Interestingly, it follows from panel B of Table 2 , that there are more variables, including some political variables, with a CDF(0) > 0.95. While some of the economic variables that we found to be robust before (DEBTSERV, INVEST1) still are, others are not.
The (lagged) current account (CURACC1) and GDPCAP1 are not as robustly related to the LHS-variable as before. Our results suggest that-other than in the previous model-various political variables also affect the likelihood of IMF involvement in a member country. To be more precise, in addition to YRSUNDER51, the CDF(0) of GOVCHANGE, ELECLEGLAG, ELEXEXLAG and ETHNIC exceed 0.95, while REPUDIATION no longer plays a significant role. Based on the estimated average coefficients, our results suggest that elections increase the likelihood that an agreement with the IMF will be signed. A plausible interpretation -and in line with our results with respect to GOVCHANGE 18 -is that new governments are more likely to agree to the conditionality encompassed in IMF lending agreements. This result lends some support to the findings of Dreher and Vaubel (2004) and Dreher (2004) .
Somewhat surprisingly, Table 2 also reports a positive coefficient for ETHNIC-a result that is not particularly robust, however (see below). Table 2 here
Overall, it would seem that political economic considerations-in particular changes in government-play quite an important role when it comes to signing an agreement between the IMF and a member country, while decisions on credit disbursement seem to be primarily based on economic considerations.
Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of our conclusions, we conducted further sensitivity analyses. Second, we have dropped large credits from the analysis. 19 The decision-making process about huge loans to countries like Brazil, Turkey, Argentina and Korea may have been very different from that of loans that are of 'going-concern' nature. However, it turned out that the results reported in Table 1 Table 2 , we even find less changes (the CDF(0) of ETHNIC drops to 0.93), while the CDF(0) of ELEXEXLEAD rises to 0.95)).
Concluding comments
The activities of the IMF continue to draw attention both in the public sphere and among economists and political scientists. In recent years, the discussion has increasingly focused on political economic factors possibly influencing IMF lending. However, despite an abundance of empirical research investigating the interaction of various political factors and IMF behavior, there is hardly a consensus which of these forces might matter, casting doubt on the general robustness of these results. To some extent this is also true for the question of which economic variables are robustly linked to IMF activity. The present paper provides a thorough robustness analysis of both economic and political determinants of IMF activity.
A first result is that IMF agreements are more likely to be concluded and IMF credit is more likely to be disbursed when real economic activity is depressed and current account problems arise. This finding supports the idea that the IMF is (still) pursuing its traditional goal of fostering economic and balance-of-payment stability among its members.
Secondly, we find that political economic factors influence IMF activity, but only to a minor degree. In fact, many of the political variables reported in the empirical literature to influence the Fund's behavior are not significantly related to either IMF lending or the conclusion of IMF agreements.
Thirdly, to the extent that political variables matter, there is a remarkable difference between factors helping to explain the conclusion of IMF agreements and the disbursement of IMF credit. It would seem that political factors-especially elections-play a significant role in the conclusion of IMF agreements. Elections increase the probability of an IMF agreement being concluded. However, the likelihood that a country actually receives IMF credit is primarily driven by economic considerations. According to our analysis, the only not strictly economic variables that have some importance in explaining IMF credit disbursement are the presence of IMF programs in the past five years, indicating persistence of IMF involvement, and the risk of repudiation. The higher the risk of repudiation, the less likely it is that a country receives IMF credit.
Finally, an interesting question is, why political factors seem to matter more for the 
